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NOTES
SEAT BET LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL REACTION
In 1798, Thomas R. Malthus, a young British minister, devel-
oped the now-famous theory which gloomily predicted that popula-
tion, unless checked by normal self-restraint, was likely to rise
faster than the productive power associated with it and, as the
population exceeded the means of subsistence, recurrent famine
would result. As some of the dubious factors which might prevent
this plight, Malthus suggested war, disease and vice. The Indus-
trial Revolution has supplied many more, one of which has been
the automobile, with its less than desirable companion, the traffic
accident."
Committed to the idea that the traffic accident is one method
of checking the growth of population which society cannot accept,
the states have embarked upon a noble but difficult campaign to
substantially lessen the frequency and severity of traffic accidents.
The present decade, particularly, has witnessed extensive legislative
activity attempting to encourage widespread use of safety seat
belts as a partial remedy for this very serious problem. This note
will examine the various legislative approaches of promoting seat
belt use and the legal problems which such legislation creates while
emphasizing the issue of whether an automobile driver or occupant's
failure to use an available safety seat belt constitutes contributory
negligence.
Seat Belt Legislation
The idea of having seat belts as standard equipment in auto-
mobiles is not a new one. As early as 1949, Nash Motors unsuc-
cessfully offered the belt as standard equipment to a very unrespon-
sive public. 2 However, with a new public consciousness over auto
safety, the 1950's and 1960's have presented compelling evidence of
seat belt effectiveness unavailable to the auto buyer of 1949. For
example, the common misconception that it was preferrable to be
thrown from the vehicle after an accidental impact was statistically
disproved by a study showing the risk of fatality among the ejected
For a discussion of Malthus and his theory, see J. BELL, A HisToRY
or ECONOmIC THOUGHT 192-214 (1953); W. PrmEszx, POPULATION 507-34
(1961).
2 The Belts Have Fastened, TIME, March 8, 1963, at 85.
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to be nearly five times greater than among those not ejected,3 and
one of the primary functions of seat belts is to prevent such ejection.
Automotive Crash Injury Research of Cornell University con-
ducted a joint study with the California Highway Patrol which
determined that seat belt users "sustained approximately 35 percent
less 'major-fatal' grade injuries than did non-users." 4  However,
the belt users sustained more "low" grade injuries, thus indicating
that the belt is not a panacea but only a method of alleviating the
severity of major injury.5
While the significant safety value of the belt was amply pre-
sented to the public through popular periodicals, acceptance up to
the early 1960's continued to be disappointing." Extensive promo-
tion by the American Medical Association, the United States
Public Health Service, and the National Safety Council also failed
to encourage the use of this protective device.7 The automotive
3 Tourin, Ejection and Automobile Fatalities, 73 PmLIc HEALTH REPoRTs
381, 383 (1958). The study further concluded that, of over five thousand
automobile deaths each year, twenty-five percent of all fatalities incurred by
occupants of passenger cars could be eliminated if ejection were completely
prevented. Seat belts were offered as a method to preclude ejection. Id.
at 390.
The use of properly designed and installed seat belts, for example,
not only protects the wearer from risks associated with ejection
but also reduces the force with which he is likely to strike objects
within the passenger compartment. It has been observed under con-
trolled laboratory conditions that the restraining action of a lap-type
seat belt reduces the force of head blows by as much as one-third. Id.
at 389.4 B. Tourin & J. Garrett, Safety Belt Effectiveness in Rural California
Automobile Accidents, 14, Feb. 1960. Four injury classifications were used:
"fatal," including those which caused death within thirty days after the
accident; "major," consisting of severe wounds, distorted members, and all
other injuries requiring the victim to be carried away; "minor," composed
of visible injuries such as bruises; and "pain," consisting of pain and
momentary unconsciousness. Id. at 4. One admitted limitation of the study
was that it was confined to California rural accidents and therefore not
indicative of seat belt effectiveness in other driving situations. Id. at 13.
Id. at 10. Some explanations for the fact that users were hurt as
often as non-users, only less severely, were (1) most occupants were within
striking distance of interior components even with the belt in use and
(2) the study was limited to drivers and front seat occupants, precluding
the possibility that belted rear seat occupants might not come in contact
with the front seat. Apparently, the lessened severity was due to (1) the
limitation of the strike zone by users and (2) the value of the seat belt
in preventing ejection.
6 See, e.g., Fales, Jr., Seat Belts: Safe or Hazardous?, ToDAY's HEALTH,
Oct, 1958, at 28; Gagen, Seat Belts: No Longer Why, But Why Not,
TODAY'S HEALTH, July, 1960, at 26; Kearney, So You Don't Use Seat
Belts?, READE's DIGEsT, July, 1963, at 121; Mahoney, A Seat Belt Could
Save Your Life, READmE's DIGEST, March, 1961, at 78; Fasten Your Seat
Belt, TImE, July 22, 1966, at 46; Should Safety Belts be Required by Law.?,
SEilOR ScHoLAsTIc, March 22, 1961, at 13.7 N.Y. JoINT LEGISLATIVE Comm. ON MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAMC
SAFETY REPORT, LEG. Doc. No. 76, at 15-16 (1963).
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industry was well aware of the value of seat belts from tests it had
conducted, but did not install them because of the public's failure
to use them even when installed and the additional cost.
9
Confronted with public and industrial apathy, the New York
State Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicles and Traffic
Safety maintained that, if seat belt installation were required by
law, the public would accept it as another of the many pieces of
mandatory safety equipment.10 In 1961, the automobile industry
yielded to the pressure of the Committee and announced it would
install anchorage units in all 1962 models enabling inexpensive
eventual installation of belts."" However, unwilling to leave this
important item of equipment to the discretion of the individual
manufacturer, the New York State Legislature enacted a bill re-
quiring such anchorage units in all New York registered cars manu-
factured after June 13, 1962, and prohibited the sale of automobile
seat belts for New York highway use not conforming to specified
minimal standards.1 2  In the same year, Wisconsin became the first
state to require the actual installation of seat belts for the front
seat anchorage units which the industry was to include in all 1962
models. 3  New York followed by amending its statute in 1962 to
require installation of at least two sets of safety belts for the front
seat of any New York registered motor vehicle manufactured or
assembled after June 30, 1964, and designated a 1965 model.14
With the guideline established by Wisconsin and New York,
other states have experimented with such legislation. Some statutes
leave the initial decision to install a belt to the individual automo-
bile owner. If he decides to purchase belts, the dealer is required
8 See id. at 16.9 N.Y. JOINT LEGrsL.ATrv Commu. ox MoToR VEHICLEs & TRAFFIC
SAFETY REPORT, LEG. Doc. No. 77, at 41 (1960).
10d. at 40. The Committee also believed that automobile manufacturers
would not install belts as standard equipment unless compelled to do so.
The industry was opposed to any bill requiring installation, supporting in
its stead legislation establishing minimum specifications for the sale of belts
within the state, thereby leaving the initial decision to install belts with
the individual automobile owner.
21 N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE CO MA. ON MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFc
SAFETY REPORT, LEG. Doc. No. 76, at 20-21 (1963).12 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 579. The statute was amended in 1962
so as to apply to automobiles manufactured or assembled after June 30,
1962, rather than June 13, 1962. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 759. The
year 1962 also witnessed the modification of the 1961 minimal standards for
automobile safety seat belts sold in the state for highway use. N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1962, ch. 758.
13 N.Y. JOINT LEGisLAvTv Comi. ON MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFIc
SAFETY REPORT, LEG. Doc. No. 76, at 22 (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. §347.48(Stpp. 1967).
14N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 759. The entire seat belt law is codified
as N.Y. VEICLE & TRAFFIC LAw § 383.
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to sell only equipment of a specified minimal quality, 5 or which
has been submitted to, and approved by, a public official or admini-
strative department.' 6 Other states also prohibit the sale of sub-
standard safety belts in one of these two ways' 7 but make manda-
tory the installation of safety seat belts on all new cars as of a
prescribed date.' As a result, those who purchase new cars after
the specified date are compelled to have seat belts installed, whereas
those with old cars may still exercise their discretion. Yet, if
a car owner in the latter group decides to purchase belts for his old
car, he is as amply protected as the new car purchaser from re-
ceiving inferior equipment.' 9 Some statutes unfortunately leave
unprotected the old car owner who purchases belts by applying the
mandatory standard for belts to apparatus installed on new automo-
biles only.20 A purchaser may unknowingly purchase an inferior
product which will snap in an automobile accident affording him
no protection whatsoever. Even more objectionable, however,
are those statutes which do not even specify minimum standards for
belts installed in new cars.2 '
'15ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-733 (Supp. 1965).1 6 FLA. STAT. ANN. §317.951(1) (Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75,
§ 843 (1960); UTAH CoDE ANN. §41-6-148.10(c) (Supp. 1967).
'7 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 27302 (1960); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-
100a(b) (Supp. 1966); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95Y2, §217.1(e) (Supp. 1966);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66'/, §296A(c) (1967); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 94,§295Y (1967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §9.2410(1) (1960), N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-135.1(b) (1965) ; OnIo RE V. CODE ANN. § 4513.262(C) (Baldwin SuDp.
1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §483.482(2)(a) (1965); VA. CoDE ANN. § 46.1-
310(c) (1967).
18 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 27309 (Supp. 1966); CON. GEN. STAT. AxN.
§ 14-100a(a) (Supp. 1966); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95'/, §217.1(a) (b) (Supp.
1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/, §296A(a) (1967); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 90, §7 (1967); MIcHr. STAT. ANN. §9.2410(2) (Suno. 1965); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §20-135.2(a) (1965); OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. 44513.262(A) (Baldwin
Supp. 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. §483.482(1) (1965); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-309.1 (a) (1967).
'
9 See Letter from Lawrence Jones to Warren G. Magnuson, Aug. 2,
1963, in U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWs 1140 (1963), wherein the impor-
tance of this type of legislation is emphasized. The efforts of the states to
encourage widespread use of seat belts via statutory compulsory installation
will be undermined if inferior and unreliable seat belts flood the market
and impair the public confidence in seat belt effectiveness.
2 0See Im. ANN. STAT. §47-2242 (1966); IowA CODE ANN. §321.445
(1966); KANt. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-5, 135 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.685 (Supp. 1966); Miss. CoDe ANN. §8254.5 (SupD. 1966);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §304.555 (1963): Moier. REv. CODES ANN. § 32-21-1502
(Supi. 1967); N.J. REv. STAT. §39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§64-20-76 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.1 (Supp. 1967);
OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12414 (Supp. 1966): R.I. GEN. LAWS ANm.
§31-23-40 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE AmN. §59-930 (Supp. 1966): VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §4(29) (1967); WASH. Rav. CoDE §46.37.510 (Supp.
1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-15-43 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §347.48(Supp. 1967).
21 GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1801 (Supp. 1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 29,
§ 1368-A (Supp. 1966); Nanm REv. STAT. § 39-7,123.05 (Supp. 1965).
[VOL. 42
The minimal standards for seat belts, whether applied to the
sale of belts in general, or to belts installed in new automobiles,
or both, range from simply prohibiting the sale of belts which fail
to conform to the minimum standards of the Society of Automotive
Engineers22 to detailed requirements of loop strength, webbing
width, etc.23 The great majority of statutes leave the standard to
be determined by a public official or department, either (1) left
entirely unguided, 24 (2) compelled to accept, as approved, belts
conforming to standards of the Society of Automotive Engineers,
25
(3) authorized or compelled to establish the Society of Automotive
Engineers' specifications,2 6 or be guided by them,2 7 or, (4) prohibit-
ed from promulgating standards below those established by the
Society of Automotive Engineers21 or some other organization2 9
In those states which require installation of belts, the burden
of installing the safety feature on new cars may fall on the manu-
facturer, dealer, or buyer of the vehicle. The shifting of the inci-
dence of the regulation is accomplished either by prohibiting auto-
mobiles without the prescribed belts from being sold or offered for
sale or trade,30 thereby placing the burden upon the manufacturer
2 2 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-733 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66%,
§296A(c) (1967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §9.2410(2) (Supp. 1965); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.685(3) (Supp. 1966) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4513.262(c)
(Baldwin Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-15-43 (1966).
23 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a(b) (Supp. 1966); N.Y. VEHICLE
& TRA nc LAW § 383(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-135.2(b) (1965); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §31-2341 (Supp. 1966) (the specifications contained
therein apply only to public service vehicles).2 4 FLA. STAT. ANN. §317.951(1) (Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 94, § 295Y (1967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §9.2410(1) (1960); NEB. REV.
STAT. §39-7,123.05 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-135.1 (1965);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §843 (1960).
2 5 IND. ANN. STAT.§ 47-2242 (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-5, 135
(Supp. 1965); MIss. CODE ANN. § 8254.5 (Supp. 1966); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 32-21-1502 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. §64-20-76 (Supp.
1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-414 (Supp. 1966); LI. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §31-2340 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. §59-930 (Supp. 1960);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (Supp. 1967).
26N.D. CENT. CODE §39-2141.1 (Supp. 1967) ; Omz. REv. STAT.
§483.484(2) (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-310(b) (1967).27N.J. REv. STAT. §39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1966).
2
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 953/2, § 217.1(d) (Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE ANN.
§41-6-148.10(b) (Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE §46.37.510 (Supp. 1965).
29 CA. VEHICLE CODE §27301 (1960) (Civil Aeronautics Administration
Technical Standard Orders for Safety Belts and Safety Harnesses).
SoCA. VEHICLE CODE § 27309 (Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1801
(Supp. 1966); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §9.2410(2) (Supp. 1965); NEB. Rrv.
STAT. §39-7,123.05 (Supp. 1965); N.J. REv. STAT. §39:3-76.2 (Supp.
1966); OKL". STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12413 (Supp. 1966); Om. REv. STAT.
§ 483.482 (1965). Some states attempt to' cover the entire commercial
transaction by prohibiting buying, selling, leasing, trading, or transferring
the vehicle without the required belt See IN. ANN. STAT. § 47-2241(1966) ; ME. Rrv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE
NOTES1968]
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or dealer, or by requiring the installation of belts in all registered
cars manufactured in a certain year or later,"' thereby placing the
onus upon the automobile owner. Some states combine the two
approaches by requiring the equipment for both a lawful sale and
registration. 2 Others require installation in order for the vehicle
to be operated on the state's roads.
3 3
More important than upon whom the statute places the burden
of costs and installation of safety equipment is the failure of these
statutes to make adequate provision for their fullest utilization.
All the statutes, except those of Rhode Island and California, fail
to require use of the seat belt by drivers or occupants, and even the
two exceptions restrict their application. The Rhode Island statute
requires use only by a driver of certain specified public service
vehicles,3 4 while California requires the proper utilization of the
belts by licensed driving instructors and student drivers when
the automobile is being used for instruction purposes.3 5 The ma-
jority of states also fail to provide complete protection by not re-
quiring belts for the rear seats.3 8
ANN. §8254.5 (Supp. 1966); MoNT. Rzv. CODES ANN. § 32-21-150.1 (Supp.
1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-20-75 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 39-21-41.1 (Supp. 1967); Onio RFv. CODE ANN. §4513.262(B) (Baldwin
Supp. 1966) (extends only to selling, leasing or renting); .I. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 31-23-39 (Supp. 1966); TErN. CODE ANN. § 59-930 (Supp. 1966);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-15-43 (1966) (does not include buying); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (Supp. 1967).
31 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 7 (Supp. 1966) (does not limit the
provision to automobiles of any specified year or later); N.Y. VEHrclC
& TRAmFIc LAW § 383(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2 (1965); R.I. LAWS
ANN. § 31-23-40 (Supp. 1966).32 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 14-100a(a) (Supp. 1966); IT I. REV. STAT.
ch. 953/2, § 217.1(a) (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. §321.445 (1966);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-5, 135 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66/2,
§ 296A(a) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(1) (Supp. 1966); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §304.555(1) (1963); WAsr. REV. CoDE §46.37.510 (Supp.
1965).
SailL. REv. STAT. ch. 95Y2, §217.1(b) (Supp. 1966); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 32-21-150.1 (Supp. 1967); N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:3-762 (Supp. 1966);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §4513.262(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1966); VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.1-309.1(a) (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (Supp. 1967).
4 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-23-41 (Supp. 1966). The statute applies
to drivers of a jitney, bus, private bus, school bus, trackless trolley coach
and authorized emergency vehicles.
35 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 27304 (Supp. 1966).
36The exceptions include: N.Y. V-Nicx_. & TRAm c LAW §383(a)
(at least one set of rear seat safety belts for each passenger for which
the vehicle was designed); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.3 (1965) (provides
for at least two sets of rear seat belts).
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The Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact
One can readily appreciate the conflicting demands made upon
automobile manufacturers as a result of the independently drafted
state legislation. Automobile manufacturers, for purely economic
reasons, may have to install a belt of the quality required by the
state with the highest standards despite the fact that many cars
may be sold in states having less stringent requirements, or, indeed,
no requirements at all. Automobile transportation has taken on an
interstate character which necessitates a more uniform approach to
safety and highway regulation. For these reasons there has been
noticeable federal activity in motor vehicle and highway matters, an
area traditionally of state concern.3 7  This has stimulated state in-
terest in an interstate compact for, among other things, vehicle
safety equipment. This action would enable the states to take
advantage of the uniformity and efficiency afforded by federal inter-
vention, while maintaining their state sovereignty.38  To date,
forty-four states have adopted the Compact.39
A "Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission" is created by the
Compact, composed of one commissioner from each party state,40
each having one vote on the Commission.41  The effect that this
machinery for interstate cooperation will have on seat belt legisla-
tion is embodied in Article V of the Compact. It empowers the
Commission to issue rules, regulations or codes prescribing perfor-
mance requirements or restrictions for any item or items of equip-
ment.42  After a study of the desirability of taking such action is
conducted, the results may be published in a report and hearings
must be held within sixty days after such publication. 43
3 See, e.g., Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-04 (Supp. II
1967) ; National Traffic & Motor Vehicles Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1391-1425 (Supp. 11 1967); Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1651-59 (Supp. 11 1967).38 For an example of the need for uniform standards of safety equip-
ment see CouNciL OF STATE GovEm EmNTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS FOR
TAumic SArrY 5 (1962).
39The six states not party to the Compact are: Alabama, Alaska,
Hawaii, Mississippi, South Carolina and West Virginia. All references to
the content of the Compact will be made to the text as contained in
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS FOR TRAFFIc
SAFETY 35-47 (1962), which is substantially identical to those of all the
adopting states, and will be cited: VEHICLE EQUIPMENT SAFETY COMPACT.
It should be noted that a state lacks the power to enter into a compact
with another state without the consent of Congress. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
Such consent was provided by Act of Aug. 20, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-684,
72 Stat. 635.
4 0 VENICIE EQUIPMENT SAFETY COMPACT art. III(a).41 1d. at art. III(b).4 2
1d. at art. V(b).
431d. at art. V(a).
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Within six months after the Commission sends notice of its
action, the motor vehicle agency of a party state must, after hear-
ings, adopt the rule, regulation or code as part of the law of the
jurisdiction,"4 or, as an alternative to this procedure, if the consti-
tution or statutes of a party state so provide, legislative approval
may be mandatory as a condition precedent for the taking effect of
any Commission rule, regulation or code within the party state."5
In the context of seat belt legislation, the hope offered by the
Compact is twofold: first, that the participating states which do
not have seat belt legislation will, by the workings of the Com-
mission, promulgate seat belt laws in their jurisdictions; 4 second,
that the conflicting and variant statutes which already exist will be
brought to conform to one another. However, the legislative ap-
proval which some states have decided to make mandatory before
a Commission rule becomes effective has provided unprogressive
legislatures with an opportunity to again reject the idea when
brought before them in the form of a proposed Commission rule
or regulation. The advantages of uniformity may not be compell-
ing enough for them to pass a bill where they are initially opposed
to the concept of compulsory use of safety equipment, or merely
against the particular piece of legislation before them.4 7
441d. at art. V(f). The motor vehicle agency of the party state may
reject the rule if, after public hearings with due notice, the agency finds
it necessary for public safety to deviate from the resolution, and incorporates
in its findings the reasons upon which it is based. Id. at art. V(g).
45The underlying purpose of the plan is to promote uniform equipment
standards adopted through efficient machinery. Yet, under this procedure
for legislative approval, there is no control by the Commission over the
activities of the respective state legislatures in adopting Commission rules.
Unnecessary variations from the recommended rule may be made to satisfy
private interests which exert pressure on the legislators, or the rule may
be shelved or rejected or passage delayed for less than satisfactory reasons.
46The states which have adopted the Compact but have failed to take
action on seat belts include: Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming.
47 The threat to the realization of the Compact purpose is a significant
one since the great majority of party states have passed legislation requiring
legislative approval of Commission rules. See Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 28-1615 (Supp. 1966); ARx. STAT. AN. § 75-2003 (Supp. 1965); CAl.
VEHICLE CODE § 28102 (Supp. 1966); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 21, § 8012 (Supp.
1966) ; GA. CDE ANN. § 68-1913 (Supp. 1966) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-2003
(Supp. 1965); ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 95%, §553 (Supp. 1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 47-3202 (1966); KAN. Gm. STAT. ANN. §8-1204 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 189.773 (Supp. 1967); LA. REv. STAT. § 32:1403 (Supp. 1964);
ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1554 (1964); MD. ANN. CDE art. 66Y2,
§ 419 (1967); MIcm. STAT. ANN. § 4.148(2) (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 304.620 (Supp. 1966); MoNT. REv. CoDs ANN. § 32-21-168 (Supp. 1967);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.483 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-20-80 (Supp.
1967); N.Y. VEHicLE & TRAmr'c LAW §384(3); N.C. GErN. STAT.§ 20-183.15 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE §39-23-03 (Supp. 1967); OHIo Rxv.
COnE ANN. § 4513.52 (Baldwin 1964); Omn. REV. STAT. § 483.676 (1965);
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The New Federal Law
Motivated by the same concern over the ever-increasing traffic
accident rate, and the need for uniform motor vehicle standards,
Congress has involved the federal government in safety equipment
activity. It was well aware of the weakness of individual state
governments and of the cooperative safety compacts.4 8 The new
legislation reflects an attempt to utilize the federal power to its
fullest extent to compensate for the inherent weakness of efforts
among the states.
Under the new National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, the Secretary of Commerce is empowered to establish federal
motor vehicle safety standards 49 which prevail over any standard
established by a state. The statute expressly denies any state the
power to enact or continue a safety standard which is not identical
to that promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce, except that a
state may enact a standard applicable to vehicles used by the state
government which is more rigorous than that established by the
federal government. 50 In prescribing standards, the Secretary is
specifically required to consult the Vehicle Equipment Safety
Commission.51 Furthermore, he is required to establish a "National
Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council," composed of representa-
tives of the general public, state and local governments, motor
vehicle manufacturers, and equipment manufacturers and dealers,5 2
with which he is to consult.5 3
The Legal Implication
Concluding the survey of the legislation in this area, attention
is now centered upon the legal implications created by the statutes.
Some of the individual state statutes have expressly provided pen-
alties for violation of the seat belt provisions, some classifying them
misdemeanors, 4 while others impose penalties without so designat-
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §2304 (Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§31-23.1-4 (Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE AN. §41-15-5 (Supp. 1965); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-308.3 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE §46.38.030 (Supp. 1965);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §347.76(2) (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-348
(Supp. 1965).43See Senate Report No. 1301 on the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 in 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2709, 2712 (1966).4 5 National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(a) (Supp. II 1967).
5015 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (Supp. II 1967).
5' 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) (2) (Supp. II 1967).
52 15 U.S.C. § 1393(a) (Supp. II 1967).
53 15 U.S.C § 1393(b) (Supp. II 1967).
54 ARi.. STAT. ANN. §75-734 (Supp. 1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-9936
(Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §47-2243 (1966); Miss. CODE ANN.§8254.5 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §304.555 (1963); MONT. REv.
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ing the violation.5 5 Some statutes explicitly state that failure to
comply with the provisions is not to be deemed an offense 56 and
evidence of failure to use the seat belt is inadmissible in any crim-
inal proceeding arising out of an automobile accident.57  Under
the Compact, absolutely no mention is made of the methods of en-
forcement or of penalties for violation of the rules, regulations and
codes established by the Commission. Such provisions were left
to the individual states to adopt, undermining the very purpose of
uniformity which sparked interest in the Compact.
The federal statute provides a uniform penalty for violation of
its provisions.5" As in many states, the onus of compliance falls
on the manufacturer and distributor of motor vehicles or motor
vehicle equipment by prohibiting the manufacture or sale, in inter-
state commerce, of automobiles or automobile equipment not in
conformity with the established standards. 59
Enforcement of seat belt statutes may also be accomplished in-
directly by the judicial application of tort concepts-i.e., the doc-
trines of contributory negligence, avoidable consequences and as-
sumption of risk. This method of enforcement might be more
effective than the existing statutory punishments outlined above
and have greater and more significant legal ramifications. If the
driver of an automobile knew that the courts might be sympathetic
to. a negligent defendant's assertion of the doctrine of contributory
negligence against an injured plaintiff motorist, predicated solely
upon such plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt, or a seat
belt which, by statute, should have been available, such motorist
may well be inclined not only to install the belt but to use it as well.
The question must then be posed as to whether the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence is an appropriate vehicle for the accomplish-
ment of this purpose, i.e., whether failure to use a seat belt consti-
CoDEs ANN. §32-21-150.3 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. §39-7,123.05
(Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 17-101(a) (Supp. 1966); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 59-930 (Supp. 1966).
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 2 17.1(e) (Supp. 1966); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 94, §295Y (1967); N.Y. VEHrci & TRAiFIc LAW §383(i); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4513.99 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 75, § 843 (1960).
56 IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (1966).
57 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A (Supp. 1966).
58National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1398(a) (Supp. II 1967).
59 15 U.S.C. § 1397(a) (1) (Supp. II 1967). If the non-compliance is
discovered after the sale of the item by a manufacturer or distributor to
a distributor or dealer and prior to the subsequent sale of the item, the
manufacturer or dealer is required to repurchase the car or automobile
equipment at the vendee's cost or furnish the vendee, free of charge,
the required conforming parts for installation by the vendee, reimbursing
him for the reasonable value of such installation. 15 U.S.C. § 1400(a)
(Supp. II 1967).
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tutes contributory negligence.6 If it is established that the doctrine
does in fact lend itself to a reasonable application to the seat belt
situation, normal human reaction might provide the balance of the
stimulus to coerce seat belt use.
Some state legislatures have forestalled this development by
expressly providing that evidence of failure to use a seat belt is
inadmissible in a civil action brought for damages," in any civil or
criminal trial arising out of an automobile accident, 2 or in any
action involving personal injuries or property damage resulting from
the use or operation of any motor vehicle. 3 The Tennessee statute
states that failure to use a seat belt is not to be considered con-
tributory negligence, nor is the failure to wear the belt to be con-
sidered in order to mitigate damages."4 Virginia likewise holds
that failure to use the belt is not to be deemed negligent.65 Most
states, however, have not precluded by legislation the possible ap-
plication of contributory negligence to the seat belt situation.
A widely accepted definition of the doctrine appears in the
Restatement of Torts:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which
falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own pro-
tection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the
negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.6 6
It is not every negligent act of the plaintiff which immunizes
the defendant from liability. The doctrine of contributory negli-
gence usually requires that the plaintiff's conduct contribute to his
injury as a proximate cause, as opposed to a remote cause or a
mere condition; if proximate causation is found, the plaintiff is
completely barred from recovery. 7
The Judicial Decisions
To date, at least six cases have reached the appellate level
which concern the tort ramifications of failure to utilize an avail-
60The discussion of contributory negligence will be predicated on the
fact that the driver of the automobile is not negligent as to any other
aspect of vehicle operation or maintenance. The sole contention of negligent
conduct will be exclusively centered around the failure to use the belt.
"8 IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (1966).62 ME. RE-V. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A (Supp. 1966).
6 3 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(4) (Supp. 1966).
64TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930 (Supp. 1966).
65VA. CODE AN. §46.1-309.1(b) (1967).
GG RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS §463 (1965); see W. PaossER,
TorTs § 64, at 427 (3d ed. 1964).
67 Doran v. City & County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 2d 477, 283 P.2d
1 (1955); Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Robbins, 52 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1951);
Nudd v. Matsonkas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
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able seat belt. In one, Kavanagh v. Butorac,8 plaintiff-appellee, a
front-seat automobile passenger, incurred injuries necessitating re-
moval of his left eye as a result of a collision with the defendant-
appellant. It was highly probable that this injury was due to
forcible contact with the rear-view mirror and it was further found
that seat belts were available, although not utilized.
One of the theories advanced by the appellant to reverse the
plaintiff's $100,000 recovery was that of avoidable consequences.
It is incumbent upon the victim of a tort to use reasonable means
to avoid or minimize the damages received, and the injured party
cannot recover for those damages which could have been avoided.69
The court noted the difference between the doctrine of avoidable
consequences and that of contributory negligence. The latter
doctrine applies to the plaintiff's conduct before he suffers from any
wrongdoing, barring all recovery if his negligent act or omission
proximately causes injury. The former doctrine directs attention
to the plaintiff's conduct subsequent to the infliction of the harm,
barring recovery of only those damages which could have been
reasonably avoided. The court refused to apply the doctrine be-
cause of the lack of sufficient authority although it conceived of its
utilization in some future case where the causes of the damages
were more clearly discernible. Even if the doctrine were applied,
commented the court, there was not enough evidence for it to
declare, as a matter of law, that the injuries would have been any
different had the belt been used. "Common knowledge and the
expert testimony inform us that only a few inches separate the
head of a seat belt user from the ...mirror."7 0
The court, also recognizing the possibility that the contributory
negligence doctrine might apply to the seat belt situation, refused
to declare its applicability to the case before it as a matter of law.
It expressly declared, however, that the holding was limited to the
facts then before it.
Brown v. Kendrick71 also involved the attempts of a defendant
to invoke the doctrine of contributory negligence against an injured
party not using an available seat belt at the time of the accident.
The answer containing the allegation was twice stricken by the trial
court, such rulings constituting the principal ground for appeal
Acknowledging the legislative activity concerning seat belts and the
controversy over their effectiveness, the court nevertheless noted that
the Florida legislature did not require use of the belts or attach any
tortious significance to the failure to use them. The court refused
to invoke the doctrine of contributory negligence, characterizing
68221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1966).69 Id. at 830; C. McCORmicx, DAMAGES § 33 (1935).
70221 N.E.2d at 833-34.
71 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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any argument between the plaintiff and defendant on the subject as
"conjectural and of doubtful propriety."7 2  Therefore, as a matter
of judicial discretion, there was no error in the trial court's refusing
to allow defendant to introduce evidence of plaintiff's failure to use
an available belt.
In Lipscomb v. Diamiani,73 the Delaware court likewise held
evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt inad-
missible, expressly approving of Brown as the best approach. 74 The
court stated that the alternative to the Brown approach was to make
the issue of whether or not the failure to use a seat belt is con-
tributory negligence a question of fact for the jury, for it was
deemed inconceivable that, absent a statute, the failure to use a belt
would constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. The
court might merely instruct the jury that the plaintiff was to use
reasonable care for his own safety under the circumstances. The
approach of using a broad jury instruction was criticized because
it offered no standard to the jury to aid in their analysis of the
variables involved in the failure to utilize an available seat belt.
Even if the evidence were admitted so as to merely invoke the
doctrine of avoidable consequences as suggested by Kavanagh, the
court feared the problem of damage apportionment. Not only is ap-
portionment ordinarily difficult, but under certain circumstances it
is impossible. And, the court further noted, the doctrine of avoid-
able consequences is not squarely appropriate to a seat belt fact
pattern since the plaintiff's alleged negligence in not avoiding ex-
cessive injury occurs prior to any injury inflicted by the defendant.
Another important factor in the court's rationale was the fear that
the traditional tort doctrine that one is usually not negligent for
failing to anticipate another's negligence might be weakened if
evidence of failure to use a seat belt were admitted.
A contrary decision was reached in Sams v. Saws,75 where the
trial court struck out the contributory negligence defense as applied
to non-use of seat belts. The appellate court held that such evidence
of contributory negligence should not have been stricken and that
the ultimate questions raised by the defense should have been de-
cided in the light of other facts offered at the trial level and not
by the court on the pleadings.
721d. at 51. The court stated, however, that the
plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt was not such negligence as
to contribute to the occurrence of the accident, nor to be the proximate
contributing cause of the injury in the absence of a showing that
the accident could have been avoided in the absence of such a
negligent act. Id.
73226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
74Id. at 916. The court stated that the "life and death area with which
we are dealing is peculiarly suited for . . . legislative exploration and
development."
75247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
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Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co. 7 6 involved the use of a seat
belt in a FiELA context. The injured party was employed by the
defendant to drive engineers for inspections along railroad lines in
defendant's vehicle. He was killed when thrown from the vehicle
after a collision with another car which caused decedent's car to
roll over several times. Expert testimony was admitted to establish
the protective value of seat belts and to offer the opinion that the
decedent would not have incurred the fatal injuries had he not been
thrown from the vehicle.7 The appellate court concluded that a
jury question was presented since the evidence was such that
reasonable men could differ as to the inferences that could be
drawn from the failure of the defendant to equip its vehicles with
seat belts. The defendant argued that the sole proximate cause of
death was the criminal negligence of the other driver. The court
rebutted by noting that FELA requires merely that the defendant's
negligence contributes "in part" to the injuries, observing that
"[t]estimony as to the number of automobile collisions in the area
in question . . . affords a basis for finding that a collision forcing
a car off the roadway is reasonably foreseeable."78
The most recent decision on the subject is Bentzler v. Braun,79
wherein an automobile passenger was injured when her driver ran
into the rear of another vehicle which had slowed down so the oc-
cupant could yell to a stranded motorist on the shoulder of the road.
One of the issues of the case centered around the plaintiff-passen-
ger's failure to utilize an available seat belt and whether such con-
duct precluded recovery. The jury found that plaintiff was negli-
gent with regard to the care to be exercised for her own safety,
but allowed recovery because of a failure to find a causal connection
between such negligence and the resultant injury. The defendants
argued that the Wisconsin seat belt statute requiring installation
likewise required use, but the court concluded that failure to use a
belt was not negligence per se.80
The court did hold, however, that there was a duty to use
the belt based on common-law principles, independent of any statu-
tory mandate. After surveying recent statistics dealing with seat
belt effectiveness and observing that an occupant of an automobile
driven by another is bound to exercise such care as a reasonably
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances for his
own safety, the court held that "in those cases where seat belts are
available and there is evidence before the jury indicating causal rela-
tionship between the injuries sustained and the failure to use seat
76 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
77 Id. at 852.78 Id. at 854. See 16 CATHoLic U.L. RZv. 345 (1967).
7 34 Wis. .2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
80 See Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis.
L. REv. 288, 290.
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belts, it is proper and necessary to instruct the jury in that re-
gard." Nevertheless, the failure of the trial court to give a
requested instruction which specifically required the jury to con-
sider the plaintiff's actions with respect to the seat belt and whether
use of the belt would have mitigated or eliminated her injuries
was held not to be in error because of a lack of evidence of causa-
tion.
Commentary
These cases reveal the difficult problems which the seat belt
fact pattern creates when common-law tort concepts are applied.
The seat belt differs from most other pieces of safety equipment in
an automobile in that it is not inherently involved in its operation.
Its value demonstrates itself only at the time of a collision and the
failure to use the belt does not contribute to the happening of the
accident. Consequently, it has been argued that it is necessary to
distinguish between contributory negligence which contributes to
the damage of the automobile and such negligence which contributes
to personal injury.82 One may operate his automobile with due
care and be involved in an accident solely because of the negligence
of another. As a result, he may incur injury to his vehicle as well
as to his person. For the former, there should be no reason why
recovery should not be allowed, but as to the latter, if the court or
jury decides to hold that failure to wear a seat belt constitutes
contributory negligence, recovery must be denied.
An analogy may be drawn to the facts in the case of Mahoney
v. Beat-nuan 3  The plaintiff's chauffeur was driving a Rolls Royce
in a southerly direction at sLxty miles per hour when it collided
with the defendant's automobile, driven ina northerly direction,
but in the plaintiff's lane. After the impact the plaintiff's chauf-
feur lost control of the vehicle, which, after making several maneu-
vers, struck a tree on the opposite side of the road. The trial
court found that the defendant was on the wrong side of the road
81 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967).
The court insisted that the proper way to frame the question was to
inquire whether the guest's negligence contributed to the injuries, and not
whether it caused the accident. Compare Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d
824, 833 (Ind. App. 1966): "Our decision that failure to fasten a seat belt
was not contributory negligence here is, of course, limited to the facts in
this case. The collision would have occurred whether or not a passenger
had his seat belt fastened." See Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49, 51
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966): "The plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt
was not such negligence as to contribute to the occurrence of the accident,
nor to be the proximate contributing cause of the injury in the absence of
a showing that the accident could have been avoided in the absence of such
a negligent act."
82 Note, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence, 12 S.D.L. Rzv. 130, 134
(1967).
83 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762 (1929).
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and that plaintiff's speed was unreasonable but did not contribute
to the collision, although it did hamper the chauffeur's control of
the car. The bulk of the injuries to the car resulted not from the
impact, but from the car hitting the tree, which occurred solely
because of the loss of control occasioned by the unreasonable speed.
In discussing the Mahoney holding, Professor Charles 0.
Gregory has suggested that:
[T]he trial judge would appear to be justified in drawing the inference
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent with respect to the
impact but was, with respect to its aftermath. Hence, if he is trying
the case without a jury, it is likely that his judgment will reflect these
inferences; and if he is trying it before a jury, he will probably instruct
it carefully so that the jury may exculpate the plaintiff as far as the
impact is concerned but may deny him recovery for the balance of his
damages which were caused not only by the impact but also by his
own too great speed and resulting lack of control.8 4
The basis of Professor Gregory's premise that the plaintiff
could be deemed contributorily negligent with respect to the after-
math, but not with respect to the accident itself, is grounded in
the foreseeability test. He contends that "if the chauffeur was
negligent with respect to the risks and hazards of loss of control
after the impact, then his negligence and the defendant's negligence
both contributed to the harm occurring after the impact."' 8 5 The
risk foreseeably involved in driving at excessive speeds is loss of
control of the vehicle. Therefore, while the plaintiff might not be
held accountable for the impact damages, such not being within
the realm of foreseeable consequence of speedy driving, he should
be held accountable with respect to damages caused by loss of
control occasioned by excessive speed.86
This argument could be employed in the seat belt situation.
The risks foreseeably involved in failing to use a seat belt are being
ejected from the vehicle or being thrown against the steering wheel.
Thus, while the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for damages
to the vehicle occasioned by the impact, such not being within the
reasonable foreseeability for failing to use a seat belt, he should
be precluded from recovering for personal injuries resulting solely
because of failure to use the belt. This mitigation of damages
approach has won the sympathy of some writers in this field. 7
84 Gregory, Justice Maltbie's Dissent in Mahoney v. Beatnma, 24 CoN.
B.J. 78, 85-86 (1950).
851d. at 87.
86 Id. at 90. See generally Green, Mahoney v. Beatinan: A Study in
Proximate Cause, 39 Yum L.J. 532, 535 (1930).
87 Levine, Legal Problems Arising From Failure to Wear Seat Belts,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1966, at 4, col. 1; Note, Automobile Seat Belts: Protec-
tion for Defendants as Well as for Motorists?, 38 S. CAr. L. REv. 733
(1965).
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There exists one significant flaw in the argument. Among the
major notions which have been offered as justification for the doc-
trine of contributory negligence have been (1) the reluctance of
the law to apportion the wrong between the two negligent parties;
(2) the clean hands doctrine, disallowing one to recover for his own
wrong; and (3) the attempt to make the personal interests of the
parties dependent upon due care.58 The suggested approach would
necessitate apportioning the damages between the two parties, hold-
ing the defendant accountable for those damages resulting from the
impact which would have been incurred even if the belt had been
worn. sD  The plaintiff would be allowed to recover notwithstanding
the fact that he attempts to redress his wrongs by going to the court
without clean hands."' The doctrine disallowing recovery for one's
own wrongs can be circumvented by arguing that one is recovering
for only those injuries which would have been incurred even if the
belt were used. For those injuries caused by the plaintiff's wrong,
he is not allowed to recover. But this still necessitates apportion-
ment.
One proponent of the mitigation argument contends that it
can apply with equal force to contributory negligence jurisdictions
because "it is nothing more than the application of the principle
of mitigation of damages, a principle accepted by most jurisdic-
tions.""'
As applied to the law of torts, a defendant may show that the
plaintiff has not suffered damages to the extent purported by him
because, for example, he has received compensation directly from
the original wrongdoer or from a fund established by him,92 such
8s Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 477, 15 N.E. 350, 360 (1887).
89 "The common law refuses to apportion damages which arise from
negligence. This it does upon considerations of public convenience and
public policy, and upon this principle ... depends also the rule which makes
the contributory negligence of a plaintiff a complete defense .... The policy
of the law in this respect is founded upon the inability of human tribunals
to mete out exact justice." C. BEAcH, JR., CONTRIBuToRY NEGLIGEN E
§ 12 (2d ed. 1892).
90 "In a number of well known fields the law has manifested its unwill-
ingness to come to the aid of persons whose conduct does not conform to
legal standards. . . . The doctrine of contributory negligence has been
variously explained, but however it be explained it is in its operation clearly
another manifestation of the law's unwillingness to aid persons whose con-
duct, here taking the form of neglectfulness, is deemed reprehensible, if this
conduct has proximate causal connection with the very injury for which
they seek reparation." Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-fea-sors, 81 U. PA. L. Rxv. 130, 131-32 (1932). For a criticism of thisjustification for the contributory negligence doctrine, see 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, JR., TORTS §222 (1956).
01Walker & Beck, Seat Belts and the Second Accident, 34 INs.
CouNsEL J. 349, 355 (1967).92 Adams v. Turner, 239 F. Supp. 643 (D.C. 1965); Christopher v.
United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Yarrington v. Thornburg,
205 A.2d 1 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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as an insurance policy, or because of partial satisfaction from the
defendant's co-tortfeasor.93
But only a minority of jurisdictions apply the principle to miti-
gate a plaintiff's damages where his negligent conduct does not
proximately contribute to the cause of the injury, but rather, to the
intensity of the resultant damages.9 4  On the other hand, if con-
tributory negligence ,is established because the defendant is able to
prove proximate causality between the plaintiff's negligence and the
resultant injuries, most courts hold that it is a complete and not
a partial defense. 95
One writer suggests that the easiest of the problems created by
attempting to apply the contributory negligence doctrine to the seat
belt situation is declaring that a duty exists on the part of the
occupant of an automobile to utilize an available seat belt. When
confronted with the statistical data available pertaining to seat belt
effectiveness, it is argued that a reasonably prudent man, in the
exercise of ordinary care, will use the belt as a means to preclude
self-injury.9
A basic tort principle comes to mind when the idea of holding
a plaintiff contributorily negligent for failure to use an available
seat belt is entertained. An individual may go through life naively
assuming that others will act with due care and will never breach
a duty owing to him, absent some circumstances which would put
a person on notice as to possible negligent conduct.07  This doctrine
may apply with great force to the automobile situation. One using
a public highway may assume that others on the road will drive
with due care and observe the laws of the road.99 To hold that
93 Anderson v. Kemp, 279 Ala. 321, 184 So. 2d 832 (1966); Anti
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 247 Mass. 1, 141 N.E. 598 (1923); Bellamy
v. Prime, 25 App. Div. 2d 923, 270 N.Y.S.2d 93 (3d Dep't 1966); Hunt v.
Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 199 A. 345 (1938).
"
4 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, 54 So. 893 (1911);
O'Keefe v. Kansas City Western Ry., 89 Kan. 322, 124 P. 416 (1912);
Smith v. Boston & M. R.R., 89 N.H. 246, 177 A. 729 (1935). For cases
allowing the plaintiff to recover the entire amount despite the fact that his
conduct, although not a proximate cause of the injury, intensified the extent
of resultant injury, see Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762
(1929); Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548, 257 N.W. 649 (1934).
F5 Ferrell v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 Ill. App. 2d 321, 179 N.E.2d 410(1961); Frandeka v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 361 Me. 245, 234 S.W.2d
540 (1950). See generally Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March,
28 CHI.-KENT L. Rnv. 304 (1950), for a discussion of the various ways
some jurisdictions have manipulated, in certain circumstances, the contribu-
tory negligence doctrine so as to reap the advantages of the mitigation of
damages feature of the comparative negligence theory.
O9 Walker'& Beck, Seat Belts and the Second Accident, 34 INs. CouN-
sEt. J. 349, 355 (1967).
$72 F. HI.Em & F. JAmEs, JR., TORTS §22.10 (1956).
98 Harrington v. Sharif, 305 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962); Fahrlander v.
Mack, 341 Ii. App. 665, 94 N.E2d 693 (1950); Kuehn v. Jenkins, 251
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the plaintiff is contributorily negligent for failure to use a seat belt
is to assume that there is incumbent upon him the responsibility
of foreseeing an accident occasioned by the negligence of another
(assuming that the plaintiff drives with due care). What then
happens to this well-entrenched tort notion that one is not negli-
gent for failing to anticipate the negligence of another?"
Some may argue that the seat belt situation should be carved
as an exception to the general rule; that a duty should be imposed
by common-law principles to stimulate defensive driving. To say
that one can rely on the fact that others will act with due care is
patently contrary to the facts as we know them.
However, this argument ignores the fact that the effectiveness
of the seat belt is not a settled question. Although in recent years
most experts have endorsed the belt, some still fear injury to the
abdomen, for example. Others show concern about the possibility
of fire and the inability of the passenger to free himself. Further-
more, the Cornell study referred to earlier showed that drivers
using belts have a tendency to speed and assume greater risks
which is possibly occasioned by a false illusion of safety created by
the belt. It would be absurd to deem the ordinarily prudent man
negligent for failing to exercise proper care for his own safety by
not using the belt when experts, far more familiar with the prob-
lem than he, cannot agree as to the belt's worth.
If the duty be imposed, and an exception be established to a
well-entrenched tort notion, it would necessitate its own exceptions
and be difficult in application. For example, at what age should
children be required to use belts? At what stage of pregnancy will
a woman be free to ride in a car without the belt? Furthermore,
such reasoning might lead the courts to require the use of har-
nesses or crash helmets, or other equally valuable safety devices.
Some argue that the possibility of imposing such a duty can be
derived from the seat belt statutes rather than from the traditional
common-law standard of ordinary care. 00 Just as a plaintiff, in
attempting to establish a duty owing to him from the defendant
and a breach of such duty, may prove the violation of a criminal
statute, the defendant may attempt to make the plaintiff's violation
Iowa 557, 100 N.W.2d 604 (1960); Carpenter v. Strimple, 190 Kan. 33,
372 P.2d 571 (1962); Knoellinger v. Hensler, 331 Mich. 197, 49 N.W.2d
136 (1951); Van Rensselaer v. Viorst, 136 N.J.L. 628, 57 A2d 49 (1948);
Robinson v. Hartinan Fuel Co., 119 N.Y.S2d 127 (City Ct. N.Y. 1953).
9 See Kleist, Thg Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18
HASTINGs L.J. 613, 615 (1967).
10o See Note, Automobile Seat Belts: Protection for Defendants as Well
as for Motorists?, .38 S. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1965); Note, Seat Belt Negli-
gence in Aidoinobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. RLr. 288.
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of a statute the basis for precluding recovery.1' 1 Essentially, the
argument runs that the statutes requiring mere installation of seat
belts impliedly require their use, any ruling to the contrary under-
mining any possible value to the legislation. Consequently, the
unexcused failure to use the belt constitutes negligence per se.
It may safely be admitted that a well-defined rule of statutory
construction allows the court to go beyond the letter of a statute
in order to fulfill the spirit or intention of the law and avoid a
frustration of its apparent purpose. 0 2  The legislative intent pre-
vails over the letter of the law.10 3  In compliance with this rule,
words may be modified or rejected and others substituted,"°  How-
ever, in order for this principle to be properly applied, there must
exist some ambiguity in the language of the statute,10 5 but an un-
ambiguous statute must be given effect in accordance to its plain and
obvious meaning.10
Most seat belt statutes leave no room for debate as to the
meaning of their terms, precluding the possibility of a court ex-
tending its meaning as is suggested. There is a notable absence
of any legislative history supporting the contention that, by requir-
ing installation, the legislatures impliedly required use. As to the
argument that the installation statutes are meaningless unless con-
strued to require use, an equally feasible purpose for the statute
is that it is used as a means of implementing the seat belt safety
campaign.'0 7
Another observation must be made when considering the ap-
plication of contributory negligence to the seat belt situation. Ac-
cepting the proposition that the contributory negligence doctrine
101 Note, Negligence-Violation of Statute or Ordinance as Negligence or
Evidence of Negligence-Rules in Minnesota, 19 MInN. L. REv. 666 (1935);
Note, The Plaintiff's Breach of Statutory Dity as a Bar in an Action of
Tort, 39 HAnv. L. REv. 1088 (1926).
102 People v. Steel, 35 Cal. App. 2d 748, 92 P.2d 815 (1939); Collision
v. State ex rel. Green, 39 Del. 460, 2 A.2d 97 (1938); Gautreau v. Board
of Electrical Examiners, 167 So. 2d 425 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A2d 310 (1954).
103 People v. Rankin, 160 Cal. App. 2d 93, 325 P.2d 10 (1958); Inship
v. Board of Trustees, 26 Ill. 2d 501, 187 N.E.24 201 (1962); Willmeth
v. Harris, 195 Kan. 322, 403 P.2d 973 (1965); Astman v. Kelly, 2 N.Y2d
567, 141 N.E.2d 899, 161 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1957).104Long v. Dick, 87 Ariz. 25, 347 P.2d 581 (1959); Montoya v.
McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771 (1961).205 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); Sakrison
v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947); Public Serv. Coordinated
Transport v. Super Serv. Bus Co., 82 N.J. Super. 371, 197 A.2d 700 (1964).108 State v. Reidy, 152 Conn. 419, 209 A.Zd 674 (1965); Berwyn Lumber
Co. v. Korshak, 34 Ill. 2d 320, 215 N.E.2d 240 (1966); Board of Comm'rs
.v. Board of School Comm'rs, 130 Ind. App. 506, 166 N.E.2d 880 (1960);
Roda v. Williatis, 195 Kan. 507, 407 P.2d 471 (1965).
107 Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 288.
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has been long criticized as being unduly harsh, a discernible trend
in modern tort law, both in legislation and judicial decisions, is to
either discount entirely the fact of the plaintiff's negligence or
diminish the plaintiff's recovery or otherwise mitigate the harshness
of the rule."" The types of actions in which the defense is effectual
are continually being limited, 10 9 while, on the other hand, there has
been an "increasing expansion of the concept of negligence where
that will lead to compensating an accident victim for his loss." 110
The future of contributory negligence promises the development of
additional means to circumvent its application and the "rule [will
be] continually chiseled away."'
The defense has been modified by the common law in three
respects: (1) it is unavailable as a defense to an intentional tort;
(2) it cannot be applied when the action is founded upon defend-
ant's violation of a statute intending to protect the plaintiff from
his own wrong, such as statutes prohibiting sale of liquor to minors;
and, (3) when the elements of the last clear chance doctrine are
satisfied.112
In light of this clear trend, it has been forcefully suggested
that the application of the contributory negligence doctrine to the
seat belt fact pattern "would be a complete contradiction to the
whole modern trend of tort law. It would expand the scope of
contributory negligence beyond its broadest application."" s
Conclusion
It may be fairly concluded that tortious significance should not
be attached to the failure to use an available seat belt. Most courts
which have reviewed the problem have looked with disfavor upon
a defendant's attempts to invoke the doctrine in this area. As pre-
viously suggested, there are essentially three reasons for this at-
titude. First and primarily, as espoused by the Brown and Lips-
comb courts, conflicting opinions concerning the value of the belt
require a legislative directive before a duty of use is found to
1os Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARX. L.
REv. 1 (1946); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mica. L. REv. 465(1953); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 189 (1950).
1092 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, JR., ToRTS §22.4 (1956).
110 Id.
"'- Id. at § 22.3.
112 Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465, 470-71 (1953).
For further discussion of the attempts to limit the application of the
doctrine, see generally 2 F. HARPI & F. JAmEs, JR., TORTs §§ 22.4-22.9(1956).
123 Keist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 613, 619 (1967).
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exist, i.e., the evaluation of seat belt effectiveness is a legislative
and, not a judicial function.
Second, if the court decided to take on the burden of de-
termining seat belt effectiveness, a difficult burden would be placed
upon the jury. Not only must the jury weigh the variables and the
conflicting expert opinions as to seat belt value in order to deter-
mine whether a particular plaintiff was negligent, but it must decide
the difficult question of causality. In the light of the number, de-
gree and direction of various forces which come to play in an
automobile collision, can the jury confidently say that the plaintiff's
injuries would not have occurred had the belt been used?
Third, the use of the contributory negligence doctrine in the
seat belt situation tends to undermine (1) the judicially recognized
presumption that, until reason for the contrary be manifested, other
users of the roads will act with due care, and (2) the trend in
modem tort law which more effectively compensates a victim for
loss and disfavors unduly severe doctrines which entirely preclude
such recovery.
Proper consideration being given all the relevant doctrines and
practical difficulties, the course of action of the Sans court should
be discounted as unduly superficial. When a new principle is un-
successfully offered as a defense to the trial court, an appellate
court should not reject the trial court's action by merely saying
that striking a pleading is a severely harsh procedure which should
be employed sparingly. If the defendant in a negligence action
invokes the doctrine of contributory negligence as a defense, the
trial court should initially determine whether the rule which al-
legedly establishes the plaintiff's negligence was in fact designed to
immunize from liability one in the defendant's position. 14 If the
rule is established for such a reason, the case goes to the jury for
factual consideration; if it is not, the court must strike the defense
as a matter of law.
On appellate review, the court must center its attention upon
the defense and the reason for the rule's existence to determine
whether there was an abuse of discretion. The court should not
reverse by merely declaring that striking the pleading was unduly
harsh without itself delving into the issue and evaluating the prin-
ciples offered. To follow the lead of the Sans court is merely to
invite trial, judges to improperly delegate their responsibilities to
the jury by redrafting a question of law, namely, whether the rule
invoked by the defendant was designed to protect one in his posi-
tion, into a question of fact, which is for the inexperienced jury'to
consider, namely, was the plaintiff's failure to use an available seat
belt the proximate cause" of his injury.
114See Green, Cqntributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L.
REv. 3 (1927)/'
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To apply contributory negligence to the seat belt fact pattern
emphatically demonstrates the conflicting arguments concerning the
doctrine. On the one hand, barring the plaintiff from recovery
solely because of the failure to use the belt, which contributes not
even an iota to the happening of the accident but may aggravate
the injury, amply corroborates those who scorn the harshness of
the contributory negligence rule. On the other hand, to travel
only half the course and allow recovery for only those injuries not
attributable to his conduct is to directly encounter the difficult
problems which the doctrine attempts to avoid, especially that of
apportionment.
As the question comes before the appellate court of each juris-
diction, an opportunity will be afforded to properly evaluate the
arguments concerning the defense of contributory negligence and
to make a decision for or against the encouragement of its con-
tinued existence. The court should carefully study the traditional
arguments for the defense and take proper cognizance of the trend
bringing about the decline of the doctrine and expanding the con-
cept of negligence to compensate the victims of a wrong. It is
submitted that if the proper balance is reached, this trend should
be given a needed stimulant by refusing to entertain evidence of a
plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt. Such a holding
could be precedent for preventing the defense of contributory negli-
gence where plaintiff's alleged negligence is not a contributing
cause of the injury, but merely a contributor to its severity.
APPEALABILITY OF AN ORDER REVOKING PROBATION
Probation is a relatively recent development in criminal law.
It is the power, exercised in the discretion of the trial judge,'
to suspend the sentence of a criminal offender and release him
subject to the performance of certain conditions set forth by the
trial judge. Violation of any one of these conditions may be the
basis for revocation of the probation.
[T]he defendant has the right to retain his probation status as long
as he complies with the conditions attached thereto. Consequently
to justify revocation of the probation, it must be shown that without
excuse, he has committed such a breach of the conditions of the pro-
bation as justify its revocation. Otherwise stated, the revocation of
probation must be fairly made, it must not be arbitrary, and the action
of the court must be supported by reasonable grounds.2
'See, e.g., Comment, Probationer's Right to Appeal;, Appellant's Right
to Probation, 28 U. CHL L. REv. 751, 752 (1961).
S25 F. WHARTON, CRImINAL LAW. & PRocsnUIm §2194 (L Andersoh
ed. Supp. 1967).
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